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AND NOW A WORD ABOUT SECULAR 
HUMANISM, SPIRITUALITY, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow* 
The papers presented in this Dialogue raise very important and 
moving questions about the relationship of spirituality, moral val-
ues, and religion to the practice of law generally, and the practice 
of conflict resolution specifically. In this Commentary, I want to 
focus on two related questions: First, where do our moral values, 
spirituality, and sense of communion or connection come from? 
And second, how do values derived from various sources of secular 
humanism inform our practices? For some of us, organized relig-
ion is not the primary source of our commitment to the "moral" 
values that inform our legal and conflict resolution practices, but 
other values or values surprisingly similar to religious values do 
inform our work. This Commentary addresses some of those alter-
native sources of "spiritual values," as used by the participants in 
this Dialogue. 
SOURCES OF VALUES 
For many of us, spiritual values, morality, and religion are 
"given," not chosen, in the sense that we accept what our fore-
bears, our culture, our family, and our racial, ethnic, or religious 
birthright, or "birth responsibility," gives us. For others of us, our 
sense of spiritual place and values has been "chosen" by conver-
sion, commitment, reattachment, or detachment from birthed en-
dowments. For some of us, spiritual values and religion are 
separate from our professional lives; for others of us, we have 
sought to inform professional practice either with traditional reli-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Visiting Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School, 2001; Chair, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and 
Standards in ADR. Thanks to Gary Menkel, Jack Himmelstein, and Howard Lesnick 
for decades worth of spiritual discussions. 
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gions1 or with modern and eclectic self-chosen notions of spiritual-
ity/ mindfulness? or alternative sources of moral values.4 
Where do our senses of moral commitments come from? Must 
moral commitments be religious in nature? What does it mean to 
speak of "spiritual" values in human action and in professional 
practice? Can one be moral and spiritual, or have one's profes-
sional practice informed by spiritual and moral "values," without 
being religious? 
These are big questions and I will not do them justice here. But I 
want to "intervene" this Commentary in the otherwise learned dis-
cussions in this Dialogue and raise another voice by asking some 
more questions about what the values are that inform our prac-
tices, and suggesting some other sources for their origins and 
development. 
I begin with a brief biographical note since I will focus on "cho-
sen," not given, aspects of spiritual values. I am the daughter of 
Holocaust survivors, both German, one Jewish, one Catholic, who 
arrived in the United States during the diaspora of the Second 
World War. Both of my parents were comfortable in Germany 
1. E.g., JOSEPH ALEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND 
LEGAL PRACTICE (1996); Joseph Alegretti, Lawyers, Clients and Covenant: A Relig-
ious Perspective on Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1998); 
HOWARD LESNICK, LISTENING FOR GOD: RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT 
(1998); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987); THOMAS L. SHAF. 
FER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981); Rus-
sell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in 
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998). 
2. E.g., Zena D. Zumeta, Spirituality and Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 25 (1993) 
(defining spirituality as "an awareness of the connectedness of all things," and discuss-
ing ways to bring it into mediation); STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: 
FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE (1999) (describing the ap-
proaches and techniques of seven kinds of spiritually oriented law practices). 
3. E.g., Len Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Possible Contributions of 
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and Clients (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). For an organization doing excellent work in, among other 
things, organizing meditative retreats for law students, lawyers, and law professors in 
collaboration with Yale University Law School, see Center for Contemplative Mind in 
Society, Northampton, Massachusetts at http://www.contemplativemind.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 17,2001). 
4. For many years, for example, I was associated with a group of legal educators 
who were using humanistic psychological principles to address "deeper" human val-
ues in the law. E.g., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY (Elizabeth Dvorkin et al. eds., 1981) (con-
sidering the impact that work in humanistic eduation can have on legal education); 
Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Hu-
manistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 
(1978) (proposing the use of "humanistic educational methodologies" in law school 
education as a way to enhance the profession). 
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before their immigration and after some struggle and harrowing 
experiences,s became "comfortable" again. But in my family, 
where the Holocaust was revisited constantly in conversation and 
retelling of experiences,6 the conclusion was not to cling to our dif-
ferent religious traditions,7 but to see the harm that religious and 
racial "belonging"g causes when difference and discrimination turn 
to hate and violence. For me, religious and racial divisions and dif-
ferences meant horrific violence, and so my childhood was spent 
thinking about ways to reduce such human suffering. My parents 
strongly rejected their own traditional religious birthrights and I 
was raised in the quasi-secular religious crucible of Ethical Culture 
in the religious "revival" of the 1950s.9 
The religion of the Ethical Culture Society, founded by Felix Ad-
ler out of the social, political, and religious progressivism of late 
nineteenth century American optimism, was, in the 1950s, a 
strange mixture of quasi-religious tenets, such as "God is spelled 
with two o's (Good)," and political commitments. lO Most members 
in New York also were active in SANE,l1 the anti-nuclear move-
ment, and the Civil Rights movement. Children attended the En-
campment for Citizenship, a multi-racial summer camp, which 
sought to teach children tolerance and appreciation for civil rights 
and international human rights along with a 1950s-acceptable ver-
5. These included Kristallnacht, Nov. 9-10, 1938, a 1941Iast-boat-out transatlantic 
passage, much suffering in racial labeling, acts of discrimination, seizure of property 
and self-respect, and, of course, the death of family members, friends, and lovers. My 
parents were lucky-they survived and became comfortable again (in family and in 
economics-the psychological harms are incalculable). 
6. All of my grandparents survived to spend twenty years of Sundays at'my child-
hood home telling stories in the German I learned to understand as a child deciphers 
parental languages. 
7. We celebrated the Christian ones-Christmas and Easter-in full pagan and 
secular splendor, with both German and American traditions. I was born on Christ-
mas Eve. 
8. For an eloquent report on modern religious and ethnic wars, see MICHAEL 
IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM 
(1993). 
9. ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALS AND COMMU-
NITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE 
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); see also PETER BERGER, THE SA-
CRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967) 
(describing the history and process of secularization). 
10. E.g., FELIX ADLER, A NEW STATEMENT OF THE AIM OF THE ETHICAL CUL-
TURE SOCIETY (1904); ALGERNON BLACK, ETHICAL CULTURE: A LIVING FAITH FOR 
MODERN MAN (1963). 
11. SANE is the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. E.g., MILTON S. KATZ, 
BAN THE BOMB: A HISTORY OF SANE: THE COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR 
POLICY 1957-1985 (1986). 
HeinOnline -- 28 Fordham Urb. L.J.  1076 2000-2001
1076 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII 
sion of basically socialistic principles, appropriately labeled an "ex-
periment in democratic processes."12 My Sunday School classes 
consisted of study of many of the world's religions, including Bud-
dhism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, Islam, Catholicism, Judaism, 
Protestantism, Taoism, and Hinduism. We also read Margaret 
Mead to learn about the human diversity in culture and living prac-
tices, and were introduced to sociology (in which I later majored in 
college) and humanistic philosophy. The obvious "morality" of 
this education was not biblical or talmudic doctrinal study and in-
culcation. Its purpose was to foster a sense of awe at human varia-
tion, and a curiosity and thirst for understanding others' lives, 
practices, traditions, and cultures. Most importantly, it sought to 
foster an internalization of something much greater than "toler-
ance"-"appreciation" for difference as well as disgust for ethnic 
and religious imperialism, coercion, conversion, violence, and wars. 
We all worked for peace and disarmament-very important and 
difficult values to work for in the era of the Cold War-and for 
civil rights (which is why peace, justice, and harmony always have 
seemed fused for me in dispute resolution work, not separated or 
antagonistic, as some have argued they are ).13 
So religious birthrights can be replaced by formative experiences 
(e.g., the Holocaust) that challenge, as well as reinforce, that into 
which we are born. For many in my generation, religious sources 
of values were trumped by political commitments. For those of us 
who took part in the political movements of the 1960s, including 
the Civil Rights, feminist, War on Poverty, anti-war, and, more re-
cently, gay rights movements, various versions of "equality" and 
"justice" were as important to us in any value structure as religious 
fidelity, chastity, worship, fellowship, and devotion to any deity or 
form of religious doctrine. As odd as it may seem today in 2001, 
our "gods" or quasi-religious figures were Karl Marx, Che 
Guevera, Martin Luther King, and, for me, Susan B. Anthony, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Simone de Beauvoir, and Michael Har-
rington (author of The Other America).14 Beginning with Karl 
12. ALGERNON BLACK, THE YOUNG CITIZENS: THE STORY OF THE ENCAMPMENT 
FOR CITIZENSHIP (1962) (describing the principles, purposes, history, and ideals of the 
Encampment movement). 
13. E.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 1 (1993) (arguing that the dispute resolution movement is based on a "har-
mony ideology" that often has the coercive effect of pacifying participants). 
14. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962). This book is credited 
with suggesting to President Kennedy the basic blueprint for what became the War on 
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Marx, these "religious preachers" taught us to see that class injus-
tice, whether organized by caste (race or gender) or by status 
(slave, laborer, or wife) was systematic, oppressive, and immoral. 
We saw that human beings could be the authors and agents of their 
own lives, rather than passively accepting their lots (remember that 
"religion is the opiate of the people").ls Thus, a belief in the.cen-
trality and importance of human, not divine, agency16 was critical 
to the "faith" of the 1960s. Our tenets of equality and fairness, as 
well as equity and justice, were informed by a respect both for indi-
vidualism and a communalism that sought to be far more inclusive 
than traditional family, religious, or nation-state formations. As 
political activists of the 1960s organized around labor, race, gender, 
economic, anti-war, and life-style17 issues, they formed alternative 
institutions (communes, group homes, participatory networks, la-
bor alliances, new relationships, and political organizations)18 that 
many believed would supplant traditional forms of family, religion, 
and workplace. These commitments were (and still are, for some) 
as strong as any of the more traditional pulls of religious or family-
inspired morality. There was moral teaching in these movements: 
people were to be treated as ends, not means; oppression of one 
person or one class by another was wrong; individuals should be 
free to self-define their destiny, and human resource allocation 
should be just and fair. 
Feminism taught another set of moral precepts. Some, such as a 
belief in equal opportunity for individuals and disapproval of op-
pression and inequality, were consistent with other political move-
Poverty. It was one of the inspirational texts for me in my decision to be a Legal 
Services lawyer for the poor. For a modern and equally moving account of how Legal 
Services lawyers are committed to the amelioration of poverty and human and politi-
cal suffering, see MELISSA FAY GREENE, PRAYING FOR SHEETROCK (1991). 
15. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Verso 
1998) (1848). 
16. Recall that the Enlightenment's emphasis on human agency and "humanism" 
was itself considered a counter-religion or counter-faith to the religious teachings it 
was seen to supplant. "Humanism" was itself a religion for many in the eighteenth 
century. 
17. As a sociology student I wrote a paper in the 1970s suggesting that the social 
revolution (divorce, changed sexual practices, racial and religious intermarriage, un-
married cohabitation, media access, etc.) likely would have longer lasting societal ef-
fects than the "political" revolutionary dreams and hopes of the 1960s. Was I right? 
18. Consider the "flowering" of new political organizations like NOW (the Na-
tional Organization of Women), SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Commit-
tee), SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), and the Black Panthers. The political 
spectrum of these groups ranged from organized legal activity such as that of the 
NAACP (National Association of the Advancement of Colored People) LDF (Legal 
Defense Fund), to more radical activity (e.g., the Weather Underground). 
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ments. Feminism also challenged contemporary thinking, 
eventually teaching (after some struggle within the movement it-
self) to valorize certain traditional "feminine" values. These in-
cluded care for others,19 mercy,2° concerns for the "needs" as well 
as instrumental "interests"21 of others, and belief in a necessity for 
the larger society to playa role in sharing the care that any social 
grouping requires. Women's consciousness raising groups, encour-
aging the "sharing" of experiences, the telling of narratives about 
oppression and pain as well as the triumphant stories of freedom 
gained, were, for many of us, substitutes for more traditional com-
munal and religious gatherings. Women organized such ceremo-
nies as feminist ·Passover Seders and "crowning" and "croning" 
rituals to mark different passages in women's lives and to create 
different kinds of sacred places and celebrations. For many, the 
Woman's Movement was both political and spiritual-women who 
were separated from each other by traditional family roles found 
new kinship and loyalties .. Explicitly, in both scholarship and prac-
tice, feminists sought to develop alternative value structures while 
seeking transformed relationships at home and in the workplace. 
Women reached out with their altered practical and spiritual con-
nections in attempts to affect the larger society in which they were 
embedded.22 
After the political and cultural revolutions of the 1960s dissi-
pated23 and were replaced by the more materialistic and selfish 
1980s and 1990s, a different form of spiritualism arose, one that 
drew us inward. Many Americans, seeking spiritual enlightenment, 
sought solace and different religious experiences in the religious 
19. See generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1999). 
20. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a 
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (discussing social 
conditions of women lawyers and offering alternative values practiced by women law-
yers); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1 (de-
picting Portia, a noblewoman posing as a Doctor of Laws, telling Shylock, a usurer, 
that mercy should temper justice). 
21. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha!? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem 
Solving and Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2001). 
22. E.g., KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE & POWER (Nancy Goldberger et al. eds., 
1996) (describing different and gendered "ways of knowing theory" and illustrating 
alternative methods of perceiving and understanding gender and knowledge). 
23. We are probably still too close to these movements to analyze them ourselves, 
though that has not stopped many participant-historians from seeking to explain just 
what happened to the mass commitments of this era. E.g., TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: 
YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987); REASSESSING THE SIXTIES: DEBATING THE 
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL LEGACY (Stephen Macedo ed., 1997). 
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and meditative practices of the East, particularly various forms of 
Zen Buddhism and a variety of "New Age" eclectic forms of mind-
fulness and reflective practice. If we could not be successful in 
changing the conditions of the material world (or alternatively, if 
we were too "successful" in the material world) we could turn to 
inner reflection and enlightenment as a source of peace, tranquil-
ity, and harmony. We could contemplate and focus on the non-
material and spiritual world either as self-defined or as learned in 
apprenticed years of contemplative practice and study. 
So when I think of the places where our moral and spiritual val-
ues are learned, I find that more influences than only traditional 
religious doctrines and practices inform how we think of our place 
in the world as human beings, citizens, or moral people. The fam-
ily, religious practice, and life experiences that form political and 
secular, as well as religious alliances, all affect our consciousness 
and moral "leaning. "24 Thus, I want to suggest that "secular hu-
manism," as I have described at least one version of it (my own) 
here, is itself a source of spiritual and moral values that informs 
both the practice of law generally and the practice of conflict reso-
lution particularly. Let me suggest briefly which values I believe 
are informed by secular humanism and explain why secular human-
ism, in my view, should be credited, as much as traditional sources 
of religious, moral, and spiritual learning, with providing informa-
tive and inspirational tenets for our practices. 
THE VALUES THAT INFORM CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICE 
Whatever the discipline from which we choose to recognize our 
values, I think that all of us at this conference, or readers of this 
Dialogue, share a sense that our professional practice should be 
informed with human significance, meaning, and "good" values. 
"Good" values enhance human flourishing, promote respect for 
others, allow us to recognize our human commonalities and con-
nections as well as our individual differences, and enable us, 
through our own actions, to make the world a better place than we 
found it. In this, lawyers (conceived as human and social problem-
solvers) and mediators or conflict resolvers (as peacemakers and 
24. Note that I have not discussed secular professional moral norms and rules here 
which is a bit odd for a legal and dispute resolution ethicist, but in fact, I think such 
rules and regulations do not form our "moral consciousness." We consult such rules 
and regulations for guidance or for post hoc rationalization of actions and moral 
stances that I believe are actually framed, at least initially, outside of these official and 
regulatory boxes. 
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healers) can find some common purposes. But it is also important, 
I think, to trace and consider our differences. Just as there are 
"false cognates" in languages there are also "false cognates" when 
we assume that words have the same meaning in different contexts. 
Litigative lawyering is not the same as mediational lawyering, just 
as not all religious and spiritual traditions mean the same thing 
when they speak of "holiness" or "salvation." So, focusing on my 
starting place of a more secular experience of humanism and spiri-
tuality-expressed as care for the other, as well as the self-and 
with a heavy dose of political "justice," I will outline briefly the 
values that I think are crucial to our practice as dispute or conflict 
resolvers.25 
Conflict resolvers begin with different perspectives on conflict. 
There is a great deal of talk in our field today about "managing" or 
"resolving" conflict, and many are drawn to the work of conflict 
resolution in order to make peace or deal with unproductive con-
flict. But others, especially those of us from the secular humanist 
group I have outlined above, were reared in conflict-familial gen-
eration gaps, struggles with authority for self-determination and re-
definition of the person, fights and arguments with lovers, bosses, 
and friends over racial and gender equality. The Civil Rights 
movement included both Mahatma Ghandi's and Martin Luther 
King's "passive resistance" and "non-violent civil disobedience,"26 
but it also included a great deal of conflict, some unfortunately 
physical, and much of it hostile and verbal. Conflict in the contexts 
of some of those political struggles allowed spiritual realignments 
as whites joined blacks and some men joined women in these ef-
forts. "We Shall Overcome," the anthem of the Civil Rights move-
ment, is both a "spiritual" song and a call to action. Thus, some of 
us see growth and movement, transformation, realignments, social 
change, and justice emerging from conflict, so that not all conflict is 
25. Within our field, "dispute" is usually intended to connote the concrete argu-
ment, dispute, or rupture that causes a problem, disagreement, or lawsuit. "Conflict" 
is the larger relationship or set of issues in which the concrete dispute may be located. 
Lawyers, mediators, arbitrators, consensus builders, and other dispute professionals 
work at both levels. Within our own discipline there is healthy disagreement about 
whether disputes are simply "settled" or whether conflicts or people can be "trans-
formed" through our practice. E.g. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, 
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994); cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of 
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Practices and Paradigms, 11 
NEG. J. 217 (1995). 
26. PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE POWERFUL: A CEN-
TURY OF NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT (2000) (describing the significant non-violent con-
flict political movements of the twentieth century). 
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bad and not all conflict must be "managed" or "resolved." I prefer 
to speak of conflict "handled" or "channeled" (productively). 
Struggle for liberation is part of The Bible and also part of a politi-
cal story. The search for liberation and autonomy is one of those 
human universals. So is the search for connection. What is not so 
universal is how much violence or physical harm we must endure 
or how much may be justified to right some of the human wrongs 
we seem to inflict on each other. (What is self-defense and what is 
aggression at the inter-personal, as well as international, level?) 
Thus, what we think about the relationship of peace and harmony 
to justice may inform how we exercise our practice. Sara Cobb's 
essay in this Dialogue27 suggests an active, dare I say "ministerial" 
or "pastoral," role for the mediator. In this role, the mediator ac-
tively engages parties in creating a narrative that brings conflict to 
the fore so it can be examined, "moralized," and reconstructed in 
proposed future actions to alter the relationship of the parties. 
Conflict is framed and scrutinized in order to examine identity, 
meaning, roles, and morality and to create change and a more 
"moral" relationship. The mediator is active, rather than passive, 
in the creation, description, and use of conflict, all presumably to 
achieve a higher purpose and a better relationship for the parties 
(and the larger workplace in which they are embedded). 
Even with a great deal of conflict expressed in a mediation or 
other dispute resolution setting, including litigation, we know we 
serve a higher purpose in the not-so-linear development of the 
human species. Mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and yes, even 
litigation, are substitutes for armed physical violence. We have 
moved from "trial by combat" to "trial by words." We hope, if we 
can deal with the "disputes" among us (both individuals and 
groups) then maybe we can prevent or discharge some of those 
disputes that would ripen into the larger "conflicts" that cause war 
and killing. So we seek peace, if not total harmony, even when we 
are at our worst in verbal combat. 
At our best, conflict resolution professionals seek to express val-
ues other than simple "peace," dispute settlement, or cessation of 
violence. Many of us prefer the instrumental, Pareto-optimizing28 
sense of solving problems in a participatory, open, and party-di-
27. Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second Generation Dispute Reso-
lution Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017 (2001). 
28. Pareto-optimizing means that each party has maximized its own gain without 
further harm to the other party. It represents the most "efficient" outcome. HOWARD 
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139 (1982). 
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rected setting to the binary, third-party neutral structure of litiga-
tion or arbitration29 that has routinized or regularized outcomes 
imposed from on high or from without. For others of us, it is the 
"reconciliation"30 of human beings or transformation of relation-
ships, which Albie Davis called the "magic" of mediation,31 and 
Sara Cobb calls the "sacred"32 moment of understanding and re-
orientation to another human being, as well as the self. For those 
of us who have experienced these moments, they are about 
changes in individuals and relationships as well as social and politi-
cal change. They can be about justice as parties reorient them-
selves in ways that seem more fair and honest and in which they 
make new promises to each other (the ceremony or ritual of medi-
ation, captured here by Sara Cobb ).33 They may enable people to 
be further connected to a larger community, not just of two, but of 
others with whom they are associated-the family, the workplace, 
or some other community.34 
But the secular humanist teachings to which I refer above also 
lead us to other values. Feminism has asked us to take caring for 
others seriously, as we recognize that we are not all always equal. 
As the disability community suggests, we are all "temporarily 
abled," most of us requiring care at early and late stages of the life 
cycle and some of us requiring care for longer periods than that. 
From our illnesses and differentially abled places, we should ac-
knowledge the interdependence of human beings in all places, in-
cluding in the family, the workplace, the place of worship, the daily 
commute, or the gym. We need and depend on each other, and 
fundamental human "needs" as well as instrumental "interests" 
need to be recognized and reconciled. We must learn to trust each 
other while giving and receiving care. Although some rail against 
the power inequalities in mediation or other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution ("ADR"), I suggest that mediation and some 
29. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
(1981) (describing the elements of the classical adjudicatory and dispute resolution 
triad). 
30. Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 
(1985). 
31. Albie Davis, The Logic Behind the Magic of Mediation, 5 NEG. J. 17 (1989). 
32. Cobb, supra note 27. 
33. [d. 
34. E.g., Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community Enabling Mediation, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (1997) (arguing that "community-enabling mediation" is an 
effective way for same sex couples to create a marriage-like union and connect to the 
larger communities, both gay and straight, in which such couples live). 
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forms of ADR are most appropriate for honestly addressing ine-
qualities and meeting the needs of unequal parties. In mediation, 
people can recognize and face up to their human responsibilities, 
not because someone has ordered them to, but because they have 
come fully to understand and comprehend someone else's reality 
and limitations. 
ADR or conflict resolution practices acknowledge a greater 
human variability of action than do the ritualized or overly stylized 
forms of litigation practice. This allows values other than being 
"right" to be imagined and enacted. Portia's plea for mercy35 or 
forgiveness, the granting of an apology36 and human acknowledg-
ment of wrongfulness, if not legal fault or blame, all allow the fuller 
expression of a richer gamut of human actions, emotions, and feel-
ings and we hope, a more humane set of responses. 
At the same time, secular humanist movements that see "justice" 
as equally important a value as forgiveness and reconciliation, re-
mind us that conflict resolution practices must serve many masters. 
It is not enough to provide a location for a sacred ceremony or a 
ritual of understanding and reconciliation if injustices remain. 
Thus, conflict resolution professionals have learned to create their 
own doctrines that recognize substantive values (equality, liberty, 
self-determination, equity, and fairness37) as well as process or 
"ceremonial" values (participation, "voice," and groundrules). 
And related to this, for me, is the misconception held by many that 
mediation cannot promise justice because it offers up too much 
compromise. In this Dialogue, Professor Bush traces the recogni-
tion of compromise in the Talmud, as a "preference for ADR" over 
rabbinical judgment.38 The motivation is one I heartily agree 
with-that the parties are better off coming to their own terms 
35. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20; SHAKESPEARE, supra note 20. 
36. E.g. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 So. CAL. L. REV. 
1009 (1999) (discussing the beneficial role of apologies in dispute resolution); Arthur 
Rosett & Hiroshi Wagatsuma, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan 
and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'y REV. 461 (1986) (discussing the different roles 
that an apology plays in American and Japanese dispute resolution). 
37. For what remains, for me, the most eloquent statement of how mediators have 
values, that include presiding over "fairness" and not genuflecting unnecessarily to 
"neutrality," see Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability 
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Ethics in Environ-
mental ADR: An Overview of Issues and Some Overarching Questions, 34 VAL. L. 
REv. 403 (2000) (considering the ethics of mediator activism in environmental ADR 
cases and discussing whether or not attorneys have an ethical obligation in such cases 
to ensure that the interests of outsiders are somehow accounted for and expressed). 
38. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR: Insights From the Jewish Tradi-
tion, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007 (2001). 
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(those they have a hand in making) rather than having to accept a 
verdict imposed from outside, even if from a wise elder. Compro-
mise, it is said, provides for peace. Adjudication produces winners 
and losers who will continue to seek rectification (appeal) or wreak 
vengeance or revenge on each other and so litigation continues the 
fighting and battles. But I would suggest that our secular human-
ism has made progress beyond the Talmud. Compromise may pro-
duce the same sense of arbitrary peace and injustice, if, for 
example, we simply "split the difference" to achieve peace and clo-
sure. Instead, as I have argued in many articles,39 rather than com-
promise, where each party is likely to feel as if they have still 
"given up something," we should seek to meet each other's needs 
and interests and not cut the orange40 or chocolate cake41 in half. 
Professor Bush would suggest that compromise includes the deeper 
religious value of "charity"-that we learn to give up more than we 
have to when we compromise and learn to "lose our self" in recog-
nition of the other.42 I agree that generosity is a value we seek to 
foster in ADR, but I wonder whether "giving up" to the other side 
may encourage feelings of patronization, resentment, and "unjust 
enrichment." Achieving a "fair" result, rather than a compromise, 
appeals to me as a more appropriate expression of the values that 
inform good mediation (or negotiation). This is what I believe 
Rabbi Hillel meant when he said, "If I am not for myself, who will 
be for me?" and "If I am only for myself, what am I?"43 We can 
seek ways for righteousness, justice and recognition of both (or 
all)44 parties to a mediation.45 Compromise need not mean "meet-
39. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). 
40. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETfING TO YES 73 (2d ed. 1991). 
41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 781. 
42. Bush, supra note 38. 
43. PIRKE ABOTH: SAYINGS OF THE FATHERS 1:14 (Isaac Unterman, ed. & trans., 
1964). 
44. It is important to recognize that many legal and other problems that are 
brought to ADR are no longer about two parties only. Many modern legal problems 
involve multiple parties and multiple stakeholders. E.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., 
THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999) (describing and illustrating the multi-
party, multi-issue social and legal disputes common in our culture today, including 
environmental, municipal finance, health care, abortion, and resource allocation 
problems); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (discussing the 
weaknesses of the modern binary adversarial system and possible approaches to ad-
dress its deficiencies). 
45. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, for my argument that transformation, em-
powerment, and recognition, the "spiritual" values of ADR, are not inconsistent with 
each other and most often are paired with the instrumental "problem-solving" aspects 
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ing halfway" or "giving something up." Solutions can be reached 
in which parties seek to meet each other's complementary needs 
without "giving in."46 
To the extent that mediation ideology contains within it the 
value of respect for the other, or reciprocity, then one should con-
sider the Golden Rule as a useful and, perhaps, almost universal, 
expression of how parties (and their lawyers)47 might deal with 
each other in dispute resolution settings. Treating others as one 
would want to be treated suggests both substantive and process 
values informed by both "spiritual respect" and "secular justice" 
concerns. When reciprocity works most effectively, it encourages a 
stance of mutual respect and real, as well as "active, listening" to 
the other. It also facilitates the kind of re-ordered private norm 
creation that caused one "god" of mediation (Lon Fuller) to sug-
gest that mediation's basic purpose is its ability to "reorient the 
parties to each other. "48 
Thus, to conclude, mediation and various other forms of ADR 
practices are informed by some basic core values, accepted almost 
universally by different religious and spiritual disciplines. As a 
form of peacemaking, mediation with its emphasis on healing, 
human understanding, apology and acknowledgment of wrong, and 
anticipation of improved future relationships expresses human pos-
sibilities for transcendence in conflict resolution. Mediation also, 
however, as I have argued here, serves important secular humanist 
values and we should not forget these. If we are to empower, rec-
of ADR. One is unlikely truly to solve a problem without some recognition and 
shared worldview (at least for purposes of making an agreement), and empowerment 
and recognition cannot really occur if some outcome is not achieved that makes the 
parties feel whole, as well as holy. 
46. The moral conception of compromise is actually quite complex, connoting 
sometimes weakness and arbitrariness in "giving up," but also sometimes facilitating 
continued relations. Our concerns are when "compromise" seems to connote giving 
up a moral principle, unless the larger moral principle is preserving the greater union 
or relationship. For a longer discussion of compromise, see generally COMPROMISE IN 
ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) and 
Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in MARY PARKER FOLLETT: PROPHET OF 
MANAGEMENT: A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920's 67 (Pauline Graham 
ed., 1996). For the role of compromise in political constitution making see, for exam-
ple, JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1996). 
47. For my argument that lawyers ought to apply the Golden Rule when dealing 
with their own clients, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic 
Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 761 (1990). 
48. Lon Fuller, Mediation: Its Form and Its Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 305, 
308 (1971). 
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ognize, and conciliate with others, we also must have justice, good 
faith, honesty, and some transparency about our processes and the 
outcomes they create. Although there are many aspects of media-
tional values that lend themselves to the "do be" list (positive 
things), we also must take account of the "don't be's" (remember 
the Ten Commandments are mostly exhortations of what not to 
do-"thou shalt nots"). ADR or mediation should not be used to 
pacify legitimate grievances or conflicts that need to be expressed. 
ADR should not produce "unjust" outcomes (whatever those 
might be, both for the parties affected by a particular dispute, as 
well as those inside of it).49 As we seek to focus on the future, we 
cannot forget the past.50 
If mediation is to express fully the values we hope for it, we face 
some interesting, if daunting, tasks ahead. First, given the diversity 
of "sources" of values for religious, spiritual and secular humanist 
inspirations for ADR practices, should we simply acknowledge a 
multiplicity of sources and "let a thousand flowers bloom?" What 
if one person's sacred recognition is another's feeling of patroniza-
tion? What ought the role of the mediator to be? Facilitator of 
compromises? Active participant in morally constructed narra-
tives? Peaceseeker? Ceremonial healer? Should we eliminate 
mechanistic ground rules (e.g., turntaking, or no interruptions) to 
allow greater spiritual and more spontaneous feelings to be ex-
pressed? Discussion about values informing professional practices 
often devolve into discussions about prudence and judgment versus 
rules. I have spent the last five years drafting ethical standards and 
principles for the practice of ADR in both individual and provider 
group settings51 and I remain agnostic on the question of whether 
49. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663,2696 (1995). 
50. For me, Trina Grillo eloquently expressed the concern that peace and future 
orientedness in mediation was disregarding the past in an unjust way. Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); 
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, 
Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413 (1997) (reminding mediators to 
focus on the past, as well as the future, when reconciling parties to each other). Many 
others, like Sara Cobb, are now exploring the importance of fully elaborated narra-
tives, including the reporting of past harms and pains, as necessary to a truly healing 
practice of mediation and reconciliation. For an interesting work exploring the bene-
fits and drawbacks of various forms of compensatory and non-compensatory mea-
sures to redress the suffering of victims of mass atrocities, see MARTHA MINOW, 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFfER GENOCIDE AND 
MASS VIOLENCE (1998). 
51. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of Professional Re-
sponsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001). 
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good values, good people, market forces, or elaborate ethical rule 
systems ultimately will control our practice. 
Second, it is one thing for us to focus on the "good values" that 
inform the best of conflict resolution or mediation practice. But as 
long as the practice of law continues to reward "hired guns," bot-
tom-lines, or simply people who prefer a good fight or a good argu-
ment,52 the healing values of lawyering must be transmitted not 
only to the mediators, but to the lawyers who appear in mediation 
and their clients. This is one place that legal work and education is 
heading, but instead of our lawschools teaching the "healing arts," 
or problem solving, I see courses on "mediation advocacy," an oxy-
moron that promises to continue traditional adversarial combat 
values and import them into newer forms of conflict resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems important to me that the sacred, religious, and spiritual 
values that inform most of what is good about conflict resolution 
should not be cabined to the church, synagogue, mosque, or zendo. 
To achieve peace, justice, reconciliation, intersubjective under-
standing, solutions of good quality to conflicts, as well as produc-
tive uses of conflict, we must consider the secular humanist values 
of self-determination and autonomy, as well as interdependence 
and mutual caring, both when they coincide with religious values, 
and also when they differ. As a member of the Ethical Culture 
Society, and as a member of the human race, I still believe that 
"god" is spelled with two "o's." What that means in lawyering and 
conflict resolution practice remains to be elaborated. The chal-
lenge will be to see whether we can join pursuit of connection, 
communion, and collective meaning with autonomy, self-determi-
nation, and justice. Good conflict resolution practice recognizes 
that when ADR works, our knowledge and understanding tran-
scend different conceptions of facts, interpretations, and meaning-
making systems. We find value in the valuing of our fellow human 
beings. 
52. Despite all the claims that lawyers are dissatisfied with their work, see Joseph 
Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 997 (2001), many lawyers I know still claim to love their work because they 
"love to win," "love to make a good argument," "love to cut a good deal," "fight for 
justice," etc. Perhaps someone ought to explore the secular, not-so-humanist, values 
that still motivate many conventional lawyers. And this, of course, does not include 
the younger generation, many members of which do not even want to practice law if 
there are other ways of making a more comfortable and bigger living. 
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